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Religious Accommodation and 
Housing 
FAIR HOUSING AFTER BLOCH V. FRISCHHOLZ 
Proper enforcement of the Fair Housing Act’s promise of equal 
housing opportunity and of the First Amendment’s guarantee to 
protect the practice of religion without the government establishing 
religion can help ensure that all persons live comfortably together in 
our pluralistic society and that all persons have access to safe, 
decent, sanitary housing where they can exercise their right to 
worship or not to worship as they choose.1 
INTRODUCTION 
As this quote astutely recognizes, the synergy of the 
distinct goals of the Fair Housing Act2 and the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment3 has the ability to produce an 
ideal situation—a nation where individuals of all religions have 
access to adequate housing in a place where they are free to 
exercise their religious beliefs. This utopia, however, has yet to 
be achieved. More than forty years after the passing of the Fair 
Housing Act, major barriers still exist and continue to be 
created, preventing individuals from living in places where 
they are free to act in accord with their religious beliefs. In fact, 
as evidenced by Bloch v. Frischholz,4 where the Seventh Circuit 
initially upheld a condominium association’s rule prohibiting 
  
 1 Michael P. Seng, The Fair Housing Act and Religious Freedom, 11 TEX. J. 
C.L. & C.R. 1, 38 (2005). 
 2 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006). 
 3 The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause states, “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The 
religion clauses of the First Amendment are applicable to the states via incorporation 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
 4 Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), 533 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2008), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
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the display of anything, including religiously-mandated objects, 
in the doorways of the condominiums, judicial decisions have 
the power to further the rift between the allied goals of the 
First Amendment and the Fair Housing Act, namely providing 
equal housing opportunities and religious freedom to all 
Americans. Decisions such as these can, and in some cases 
have, made it harder for individuals in protected classes to 
obtain access to housing where they are free from religious 
persecution.5 Today, some individuals in the United States are 
faced with the decision of compromising their religious beliefs 
or moving out of their homes.  
In 1968, the Fair Housing Act was enacted as an effort 
to control the pervasive discrimination in the housing market.6 
Prohibiting discrimination by both public and private housing 
providers, the statute lays out protected classes of individuals, 
including the religiously observant, who may not be subject to 
discrimination.7 Because the Fair Housing Act applies to both 
public and private housing, it creates First Amendment 
obligations for private entities that previously did not exist. 
The First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses prohibit laws that burden the practice of religion and 
government action which promotes religion, respectively.8 As 
such, housing providers are required to provide non-
discriminatory housing in a way that neither favors nor 
disadvantages the free exercise of religion.9  
On July 10, 2008, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
constitutionality of a condominium association’s rule that 
effectively achieves the opposite of the utopian dream described 
  
 5 See Boodram v. Md. Farms Condo., No. 93-1320, 1994 WL 31025, at *1 (4th 
Cir. Feb. 1, 1994) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant condominium 
association despite plaintiff’s claim that the association’s rule prohibiting storage on 
condominium balconies interfered with his religious duty to display red flags, known as 
“Jhandee,” as compelled by the Hindu faith); see also Savanna Club Worship Serv. v. 
Savanna Club Homeowners’ Ass’n, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1224, 1234 (S.D. Fla. 2005) 
(holding that homeowners’ associations have the right to prohibit religious worship in 
the common areas of their communities). 
 6 Seng, supra note 1, at 1; see also U.S. Dep’t. of Housing and Urban Dev., 
History of Fair Housing, http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/aboutfheo/history.cfm (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2009). 
 7 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (stating that it is unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or 
rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental 
of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, 
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”). 
 8 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 9 Seng, supra note 1, at 1. 
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above.10 In its initial review of Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), a 
two-to-one decision, the court affirmed the Northern District of 
Illinois’ grant of summary judgment in favor of a condominium 
association whose prohibition on the placement of anything in 
the doorways of the condominiums, including religiously-
mandated objects, was challenged by one of the condominium 
owners.11 The decision essentially held that condominium 
associations may make rules that inhibit the exercise of 
religion so long as the rule is “neutrally applicable.”12 In 
particular, the court found that even though observant Jewish 
condominium owners felt prohibited from living in their homes 
once the condominium rule was interpreted to prohibit the 
display of mezuzot,13 the rule was not in violation of either the 
First Amendment or the Fair Housing Act, which, as currently 
written, does not require accommodation for religion.14 On 
November 13, 2009, six months after the Seventh Circuit 
reheard the case en banc, the court decided that although the 
condominium’s rule did not make the condominiums 
“unavailable,” factual issues did exist with regard to the issue 
of intentional discrimination, rendering total summary 
judgment improper and remanding the case for further 
proceedings.15 
This Note argues that the Seventh Circuit’s en banc 
ruling in Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch II) only partially remedies 
the potentially harsh policy implications that could have 
resulted from the circuit’s initial ruling. The en banc decision 
failed to recognize that the actions taken by the condominium 
  
 10 See Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), 533 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2008), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 11 Id. at 563. Judges Easterbrook and Bauer were in the majority and Judge 
Wood wrote in dissent. 
 12 Id. at 565 (“Plaintiffs would like us to treat failure to make an 
accommodation as a form of discrimination. That was one theme of Justice O’Connor’s 
separate opinion in Smith—but the majority held that a neutral, exception-free rule is 
not discriminatory and is compatible with the Constitution’s free exercise clause.”). 
 13 A mezuzah (the singular of mezuzot) is a “parchment scroll affixed to the 
doorposts of a Jewish home or business” that contains portions of a Jewish prayer. 
Chabad.org, Mezuzah—Definition, http://www.chabad.org/search/keyword_cdo/kid/ 
2891/jewish/Mezuzah.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2009). The Torah commands all Jews 
to place a mezuzah on the outer doorpost of the home, and in all doorways therein, as a 
reminder of the oneness of G-d and in order to protect the home and its inhabitants. 
Alexander Potorak, Rooms and Doorposts, http://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/ 
aid/256734/jewish/Rooms-and-Doorposts.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2009). Mezuzot is 
the plural form of the word mezuzah. Mezuzah—Definition, http://www.britannica.com/ 
EBchecked/topic/379549/mezuzah (last visited Aug. 30, 2009). 
 14 Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 565. 
 15 Bloch v Frischholz (Bloch II), 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009).  
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board rendered the units unavailable to observant Jews.16 Thus, 
the new ruling does not completely nullify the ability of 
housing associations to create rules like this in the future. 
Furthermore, if on remand the issue of intentional 
discrimination is not resolved in the Blochs’ favor, the door will 
remain open for discriminatory housing practices to prevail. 
Finally, because this decision is not binding on all federal 
courts, courts outside the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit 
could easily render the same mistaken ruling as the Bloch I 
court, which would result in consequences inconsistent with 
both the congressional intent of the Fair Housing Act and the 
general common law on issues of religious accommodation in 
contexts parallel to housing. In order to prevent judicial 
decisions such as these from producing results adverse to those 
envisioned by the legislature, it is vital that the legislature 
take action to avert the disparaging consequences that would 
otherwise result.  
Part I of this Note discusses the factual underpinnings 
of the Bloch decisions to give context to the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision and the analysis contained herein. Part II briefly 
discusses the historical interaction between the Fair Housing 
Act and the First Amendment, focusing on how these laws 
work together and affect one another. Part III analyzes the 
legislative history and congressional intent of the Fair Housing 
Act and examines how religious accommodation has been dealt 
with in the employment context, where there is a statutorily 
imposed religious accommodation requirement. This analysis 
seeks to assess whether Bloch I and II were rightfully decided 
and explore the potential for a religious accommodation 
requirement under the Fair Housing Act in the future. Finally, 
Part IV discusses the implications of the Bloch decisions and 
suggests a road for moving forward. These suggestions aim to 
provide a way to overcome the harsh impact that such 
decisions could produce. In light of the disturbing potential 
consequences of the initial decision, and the fact that these 
consequences have not been completely obviated, it is 
imperative that Congress act to rectify the judiciary’s failure to 
protect the spirit of the Fair Housing Act. 
  
 16 Id. at 776-84. 
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I. THE CASE: BLOCH V. FRISCHHOLZ 
In a two-to-one decision in Bloch v. Frischholz, upon 
first review the Seventh Circuit held that a condominium 
association’s rule of not allowing anything to be placed in 
condominium doorways, including religiously-mandated 
objects, did not violate either the First Amendment or the Fair 
Housing Act, and was therefore constitutional.17 Finding the 
rule to be neutrally applicable to all condominium owners 
regardless of their religious beliefs, the court affirmed the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
condominium association.18 This decision is incongruous with 
the legislative intent of the Fair Housing Act and the 
established legal precedent in parallel contexts. These 
incongruities were not completely remedied by the Seventh 
Circuit’s en banc rehearing, where the court found that 
although issues of fact existed as to the Blochs’ claim of 
intentional discrimination, the condominium association’s rule 
was not in violation of the Fair Housing Act.19 
A. Bloch v. Frischholz: The Facts 
Lynne, Helen, and Nathan Bloch, observant Jews and 
residents of the Shoreline Towers condominium building in 
Chicago, Illinois, brought suit against the Shoreline Towers 
Condominium Association and its president, Edward 
Frischholz, alleging intentional discrimination in violation of 
the Fair Housing Act20 and the Civil Rights Act.21 The claims 
arose out of a “hallway rule” that the condominium association 
adopted in September 2001, while Lynne Bloch was the chair of 
the rules committee. The rule stated: “1. Mats, boots, shoes, 
carts, or objects of any sort are prohibited outside Unit 
entrance doors. 2. Signs or name plates must not be placed on 
Unit doors.”22 The rule did not become problematic until 2004, 
when the association began to interpret the rule as prohibiting 
  
 17 Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 565.  
 18 Id. at 564-65. 
 19 Bloch II, 587 F.3d 771. 
 20 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a)-(b), 3617 (2006). 
 21 Id. § 1982; Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 569 (Wood, J. dissenting). 
 22 Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 567 (Wood, J. dissenting). 
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the placement of mezuzot on the exterior doorposts of the 
units.23  
During a renovation of the hallways of the Shoreline 
Towers in May 2004, the residents were instructed to remove 
all items from their doors so that construction could be 
completed.24 The Blochs complied, and once the renovations 
were completed, proceeded to reaffix their mezuzah to the 
entrance of their unit.25 Shortly thereafter, the condominium 
association began removing and confiscating mezuzot from 
entranceways in the building, claiming that they were in 
violation of the hallway rule.26 Previously, the rule had only 
been used to prevent clutter in the hallway as well as “signs 
and name plates” as explicitly stated, but not mezuzot.27 
However, despite plaintiffs’ objections, explaining the religious 
significance and importance of the mezuzah, the condominium 
association offered no relief. Instead, the condominium 
association continually removed plaintiffs’ mezuzot and 
threatened monetary penalties if they continued to affix a 
mezuzah in their doorway.28  
After the death of Marvin Bloch, Lynne’s husband and 
Helen and Nathan’s father, the Blochs specifically requested 
permission to display a mezuzah in accordance with Jewish 
mourning rituals.29 Despite their request, the condominium 
association removed their mezuzah during this traumatic 
time.30 Debra Glassman, another Shoreline Towers resident and 
observant Jew, was treated in a similar fashion, forcing her to 
move out of her unit.31 She felt that “she had essentially been 
evicted from her home,” because the condominium association 
prevented her from displaying her mezuzah as required by the 
laws of her religion.32  
  
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 568. 
 32 Id.; see also Deuteronomy 6:5-9 (instructing all Jews that “[y]ou shall write 
[the commandments] on the doorposts of your house and on your gates”). Both orthodox 
and non-orthodox Jews affix the prayer to their doorpost, as required, in a mezuzah. 
Dennis W. Carlton & Avi Weiss, The Economics of Religion, Jewish Survival, and 
Jewish Attitudes Toward Competition in Torah Education, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 253, 263 
n.27 (2001). Mezuzot are required because they serve as a constant reminder of the 
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In the aftermath, Lynne Bloch proposed an amendment 
to the hallway rule that would allow mezuzot to be displayed on 
exterior doorways, to no avail.33 In December 2006, the Blochs 
filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois.34 Before the Blochs 
filed their suit, however, the Shoreline Towers Condominium 
Association’s board adopted a religious exception to the hallway 
rules.35 Thus, the relief sought by the Blochs merely consisted of 
damages for the distress suffered before the exception was 
enacted, as well as an injunction to prevent the association 
from restoring the old interpretation of the rule.36 Additionally, 
about a year before the Blochs filed their complaint, the city of 
Chicago enacted an ordinance prohibiting residential building 
owners from restricting the placement of religious objects in 
the doorways of homes, unless necessary to avoid property 
damage or undue hardship to other unit owners.37 This 
ordinance made it illegal for the Association to revert to its 
prior version of the rule. Thus, the Blochs’ suit essentially only 
involved a quest for damages, allowing the issue raised by the 
Blochs to remain ripe for adjudication.38 
B. Bloch v. Frischholz: The Suit 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the condominium association and Frischholz based on the 
Seventh Circuit’s holding in Halprin v. Prairie Single Family 
Homes of Dearborn Park Association,39 and the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed.40 Writing for the circuit court, Chief Judge Frank 
Easterbrook explained that Halprin stood for the proposition 
that harassment of owners or tenants, even though religiously 
motivated, was not a Fair Housing Act violation.41 Only when 
  
“Divine Presence and of the obligation to observe all the commandments.” James D. 
Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CALI. L. REV. 91, 106 n.123 (1991); 
supra note 13. 
 33 Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 568 (Wood, J. dissenting).  
 34 Bloch v. Frischholz, No. 06-C-4472, 2008 WL 244287 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 
2008). 
 35 Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 563. 
 36 Id.  
 37 Id. at 564; see also CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 05-8-030(H) (2005). 
 38 Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 564.  
 39 388 F.3d 327, 328-30 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that the Fair Housing Act 
was not violated by religiously-based harassment of homeowners because it was not 
discrimination in the “sale or rental” of a dwelling). 
 40 Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 565. 
 41 Id. at 563. 
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the harassment is so severe as to amount to constructive 
eviction can a violation be found.42 Finding the hallway rule 
neutral with respect to religion because it was generally 
applicable to all condominium owners, the court held that a 
determination of whether the rule resulted in the constructive 
eviction of the Blochs was unnecessary.43 Finally, the court 
explained that it saw the suit as seeking a religious exception 
to a neutral rule—a religious accommodation—something not 
required by the language of the Fair Housing Act.44 Because the 
Fair Housing Act sees discrimination as more than a “failure to 
accommodate,” the court found no violation of the Fair Housing 
Act or the First Amendment in Shoreline Towers’ refusal to 
accommodate the religious beliefs of the Jewish homeowners.45 
In a vehement dissent, Judge Diane Wood disagreed 
with the majority’s grant of summary judgment.46 She noted 
that the court wrongly framed the issue on appeal and thus did 
not properly address the claims asserted by the plaintiffs.47 
According to Judge Wood, instead of viewing the Blochs’ claim 
as a quest for religious accommodation, the court should have 
reached the question of whether the inability to display a 
mezuzah in one’s doorway resulted in the constructive eviction 
of observant Jewish residents, and should have found that 
plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence to prove constructive 
eviction.48 Judge Wood found the hallway rule to be the 
equivalent of a sign outside the building reading “No observant 
Jews allowed,” and as such, the situation presented in the case 
was exactly that imagined by Fair Housing Act’s Section 
3604(a) as interpreted in Halprin.49 Furthermore, Judge Wood 
  
 42 Id. at 564. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 565 (explaining that the language of the Fair Housing Act only 
requires accommodations for handicaps and not for religion or the other classes 
protected by the Act). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 566. 
 47 Id. (The Court addressed the issue of whether the condominium 
association had a duty to accommodate plaintiffs’ religious beliefs rather than 
analyzing the actual issue, that is, whether the association intentionally discriminated 
against plaintiffs based on their religious beliefs.). 
 48 Id. at 570. 
 49 Id. In Halprin, the Seventh Circuit found that religiously motivated 
harassment of owners and tenants did not to violate the Fair Housing Act after it gave 
a limited interpretation of Section 3604(b) and refused to look beyond the plain 
meaning of the words contained in the statute. See Bloch, 533 F.3d at 563; see also 
Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 
2004) (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant homeowners’ association, 
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noted that the Section 3604(b) claim asserted by the Blochs 
was factually sufficient because the Fair Housing Act 
prohibited, among other things, religious discrimination in “the 
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling,” 
and the agency responsible for regulating the implementation 
of the Fair Housing Act, the United States Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), had interpreted 
this language to protect “an owner, tenant, or a person 
associated with him or her.”50 
Judge Wood argued that summary judgment was 
incorrect because the question of whether the hallway rule 
applied to mezuzot was both material and in dispute.51 Thus, 
the majority’s characterization of the rule as being facially 
neutral was improper, since that would require a finding that 
the rule does include a prohibition on the display of mezuzot.52 
According to Judge Wood, the whole point of the case is that 
the Association took a neutral rule and started interpreting it 
in a way that exclusively affected observant Jewish owners.53 In 
such a situation, it is not just the fact that a rule is neutral 
that is of importance. Rather, she argued that it is necessary to 
assess whether the rule “target[s] the practices of a particular 
religion for discriminatory treatment” in order to determine if 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment has been 
violated.54 In Judge Wood’s opinion, this was exactly the 
situation at bar—the rule may have been facially neutral, but 
it had a disparate impact on observant Jews, therefore 
invaliding its neutrality.55 Finally, Judge Wood opined that the 
Blochs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 was also sustainable.56 
  
and finding that religious harassment of plaintiff homeowners by association president 
did not violate § 3604(b) because it was not harassment that “prevented [people] from 
acquiring property” since the couple already owned their home). 
 50 Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 570-71 (Wood, J., dissenting); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) 
(2008); 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(4) (2008). 
 51 Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 572 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 573 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520, 557 (1993)). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. Judge Wood explained that the Blochs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 
was also sustainable because the language of the statute leads to the same end result 
as would be the outcome under the Fair Housing Act claims. Under Section 1982 or the 
Fair Housing Act, the Blochs must prove intentional discrimination, an issue of which 
they have provided ample evidence, surely enough to withstand a motion for summary 
judgment from the association. Id. 
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On May 13, 2009, the Seventh Circuit reheard the 
Blochs’ case en banc.57 The United States government felt so 
strongly that the Seventh Circuit erred in its initial ruling that 
it submitted an amicus brief urging the en banc panel to 
reverse and remand the case.58 In its brief, the government 
argued that the Seventh Circuit’s ruling is out of line with the 
congressional intent of the Fair Housing Act and that summary 
judgment was inappropriate because enough questions of fact 
existed to make the case ripe for jury determination as to the 
existence of discrimination.59 The government conceded that the 
text of the Fair Housing Act does not currently require 
religious accommodation, but remained silent on the issue of 
whether such a clause is inferred by the spirit of the Act or the 
Constitution.60 
Six months after hearing the case en banc, the Seventh 
Circuit partially amended its initial ruling.61 The en banc court 
saw the case as presenting two distinct issues. The first issue 
was which, if any, of the Fair Housing Act provisions could be a 
potential source of relief for the Blochs.62 The second issue was 
whether the Blochs put forth sufficient evidence of 
discrimination to create an issue of fact to be resolved at trial.63 
As to the first issue, the court looked at whether the Fair 
Housing Act can afford relief for claims of post-sale 
discrimination.64 While the court acknowledged that Section 
3604(a) can be violated post-acquisition in extreme cases of 
“constructive eviction,” it found that the condominium at issue 
here was never actually made “unavailable” to the Blochs, and 
therefore affirmed the grant of summary judgment on this 
issue.65 On the issue of intentional discrimination, the court 
  
 57 Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch II), 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009). For an audio 
version of the argument, see 2009 WL 1472344.  
 58 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants Urging Reversal and Remand on Fair Housing Act Claims, Bloch v. 
Frischholz, 533 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3376). 
 59 Id. at *13-14. 
 60 Id. at *43-44. This Note seeks to argue that although the Fair Housing Act 
does not contain a religious accommodation clause, such a clause is necessary for the 
Act to be congruent with the congressional intent of the statute, the First Amendment, 
and how religious accommodation is handled in parallel contexts, namely employment 
under Title VI. See infra Part III.A-C. 
 61 Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 787. 
 62 Id. at 775. 
 63 Id. at 775-76.  
 64 Id. at 775.  
 65 Id. at 777-78 (“To establish a claim for constructive eviction, a tenant need 
not move out the minute the landlord’s conduct begins to render the dwelling 
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found that the Blochs had presented sufficient evidence of 
genuine issues of fact to warrant a trial.66 Consequently, the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment and the circuit 
panel’s affirmation was reversed, and the Blochs’ case was 
remanded.67 
II. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act, or the Fair Housing 
Act,68 was enacted in 1968 during the height of the Civil Rights 
Movement, and in the aftermath of the assassination of Martin 
Luther King, Jr., as a congressional effort to curb rampant 
discrimination in the housing market.69 The Act prohibits 
discrimination in the sale, rental, and housing provisions of 
both public and private housing providers, subject to certain 
exemptions,70 on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, familial 
status, [and] national origin.”71 Through the inclusion of 
religion in the list of protected classes, the drafters implicated 
the First Amendment in the Fair Housing Act’s 
interpretation.72 Although the First Amendment generally 
applies only to public entities, because the Fair Housing Act 
outlaws discrimination in both private and public housing, it 
effectively creates First Amendment obligations for private 
housing authorities. Therefore, in applying the Fair Housing 
Act, a delicate balance must be struck between neither favoring 
nor disadvantaging religion, as mandated by the First 
Amendment.73  
  
uninhabitable—in this case, when the defendants began enforcing the Hallway Rule to 
take down the Blochs’ mezuzot. Tenants have a reasonable time to vacate the premises. 
Nonetheless, it is well-understood that constructive eviction requires surrender of 
possession by the tenant. Still, the Blochs never moved out.” (internal citations 
omitted)).  
 66 Id. at 785 (“Although the Blochs’ case is no slam dunk, we think the record 
contains sufficient evidence, with reasonable inferences drawn in the Blochs’ favor, 
that there are genuine issues for trial on intentional discrimination.”). 
 67 Id. at 787.  
 68 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2006). 
 69 Seng, supra note 1, at 1; see also U.S. Dep’t. of Housing and Urban Dev., 
History of Fair Housing, http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/aboutfheo/history.cfm (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2009). 
 70 See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b). 
 71 Id. § 3604(a)-(b). 
 72 See, e.g., id. § 3604(a) (stating that it is unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent 
after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, 
or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, 
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin”). 
 73 Seng, supra note 1, at 1. 
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Congress intended the Fair Housing Act to “provide, 
within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout 
the United States,”74 in an effort to promote racially integrated 
housing.75 Although primarily designed as a remedial tool to 
deal with segregated housing patterns in the United States,76 
the statute not only sought fair housing for individuals 
discriminated against on the basis of race, but also took on the 
broader task of providing fair housing to other individuals who 
are likely to be the subject of discrimination.77 Both the 
Department of Justice, by way of the Attorney General, and 
individuals are eligible to bring suit under the Fair Housing 
Act.78 However, while individuals are only required to show 
that they have been victims to an illegal housing practice, the 
Department of Justice must point to a “pattern or practice” of 
discrimination in order to establish a cause of action.79 
The Supreme Court has had surprisingly minimal 
interaction with substantive Fair Housing Act claims in the 
forty years since its enactment.80 Circuit courts, however, have 
had extensive engagement with Fair Housing claims and have 
developed standards under which evaluation of such claims are 
to be assessed. Specifically, these courts have determined that 
violations of the Fair Housing Act can be established on one of 
two grounds—disparate impact or disparate treatment.81  
Generally, to establish a disparate impact claim, a 
claimant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination, 
demonstrating that the defendant’s conduct has a 
discriminatory effect.82 More specifically, a claimant must prove 
that the challenged practice “actually or predictably” results in 
  
 74 42 U.S.C. § 3601. 
 75 Otero v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973).  
 76 U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div. Housing and Civil Enforcement 
Section, The Fair Housing Act, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/housing/housing_coverage.htm 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2009) [hereinafter The Fair Housing Act].  
 77 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of “race, color, 
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin”).  
 78 See id. §§ 3613-14. 
 79 The Fair Housing Act, supra note 76. 
 80 Supreme Court cases on the Fair Housing Act have mostly been limited to 
addressing procedural issues such as standing under the Fair Housing Act. See Havens 
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 366 (1981); Gladstone, Realtors v. Bellwood, 
441 U.S. 91, 93 (1978); Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208 (1972). 
 81 Leblanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 425 (2d Cir. 1995).  
 82 This is similar to the requirement for alleging a cause of action under Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act. See Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir. 
1974); see also infra Part III.C.  
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discrimination based on one of the prohibited classifications.83 A 
claimant need not show that such action is discriminatorily 
motivated, but merely that the defendant’s action has a 
discriminatory effect.84 For these types of claims, a claimant is 
required to prove a “causal connection” between the 
questionable policy and the resulting disparate impact on the 
protected group.85  
Alternatively, Fair Housing Act violations can be 
established based on a disparate treatment theory. Under this 
theory, a claimant can establish a prima facie showing of 
discrimination by “showing that animus against the protected 
group ‘was a significant factor in the position taken.’”86 
Allegations of discriminatory intent must be analyzed based on 
the totality of the circumstances, taking into account the fact 
that some “law[s] bear more heavily” on one group of people 
than others.87 Other factors considered in this analysis are the 
historical background of the decision, the events leading up to 
the decision, and statements made by individuals involved in 
the decision-making.88  
The type of evidence used to make out a claim of 
religious discrimination under the Fair Housing Act is the 
same type used in assessing the religious animus of a law for 
the purpose of assessing its constitutionality under the First 
Amendment.89 Therefore, claims of religious discrimination in 
the sale, rental, or privileges of the sale or rental of a dwelling 
lead to the intersection of the Fair Housing Act and the First 
Amendment.90 Under the First Amendment, in order for a 
facially neutral rule to constitutionally prohibit conduct that 
inhibits the practice of religion, there must be a religiously 
  
 83 United States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 
1975); see also United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 
493 F.2d 799, 808 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 84 City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d at 1184-85. 
 85 Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 712 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Lopez 
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1991)).  
 86 Leblanc-Sternberg, 67 F.3d at 425 (quoting United States v. Yonkers Bd. of 
Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1226 (2d Cir. 1987)).  
 87 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
 88 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267-68 
(1977).  
 89 Leblanc-Sternberg, 67 F.3d at 426 (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540 (1993)). Specifically, this type of evidence is 
used to prove religious animus for disparate treatment claims. See id. 
 90 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(b) (2006); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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neutral reason to justify the rule.91 Thus, claims of religious 
discrimination brought under the Fair Housing Act necessarily 
implicate the right to the free exercise of religion guaranteed 
by First Amendment.92  
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S MISSTEP: ANALYSIS OF BLOCH 
The Seventh Circuit’s decisions in Bloch I and II were 
wrongly decided for a number of reasons. To begin, the court’s 
consistent conclusion that the Fair Housing Act does not 
require accommodation for religion fails to look beyond the 
words of the statute in assessing its applicability to the 
situation faced by the Blochs. In addition, the Bloch I panel’s 
classification of the hallway rule in question as neutrally-
applicable, and thus consistent with the requirements of the 
First Amendment, fails to consider disparate impact analysis.93 
Furthermore, the decision is inconsistent with how religious 
accommodation has been dealt with in the parallel context of 
workplace discrimination. Finally, the policy implications of 
the initial holding are problematic, and have vast consequences 
for the future of the housing market that the en banc ruling did 
not ameliorate. Depending on how the case is decided on 
remand and whether other circuits follow the rehearing of the 
Seventh Circuit’s initial ruling, the private housing market 
may now be able to effectively exclude protected classes, 
making the Fair Housing Act’s goal of rendering adequate 
housing to all individuals, regardless of their religious beliefs, 
unachievable.  
Part A of this Section discusses why the congressional 
intent of the Fair Housing Act requires religious 
accommodation, despite the absence of explicit language to this 
effect. Part B analyzes the need for a religious accommodation 
clause under the Fair Housing Act because of the First 
Amendment implications in the absence of such a requirement. 
Next, Part C assesses how religious accommodation is dealt 
with under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, where religious 
accommodation is statutorily mandated, in an effort to prove 
that such a requirement is consistent with First Amendment 
jurisprudence in the employment context. Finally, Part D looks 
  
 91 See Church of Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 531-32. 
 92 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 93 See Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), 533 F.3d 562, 573 (7th Cir. 2008) (Wood, 
J., dissenting), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
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at disparate impact analysis to show why the Seventh Circuit 
twice erred in its failure to assess the Blochs’ claim on these 
grounds.  
A. Reconciling Bloch and the Congressional Intent of the 
Fair Housing Act 
The Fair Housing Act does not contain an explicit 
requirement that public or private housing providers make 
accommodations for religious individuals.94 But looking beyond 
the plain meaning of the words contained in the Act—to the 
congressional intent in enacting this legislation—reveals that 
such a requirement is essential in order for the Act to achieve 
its stated goals.95 Expanding the scope of statutory 
interpretation afforded to the Fair Housing Act by the Seventh 
Circuit exposes the fact that its narrow reading fails to give 
proper breadth to the Act, and consequently fails to grant relief 
to those individuals who are harmed by housing providers’ 
failure to make reasonable accommodations for the religiously 
observant. These results are in direct conflict with the spirit of 
the Act, and its ability to “provide . . . for fair housing 
throughout the United States.”96 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has itself endorsed a liberal reading of the Act, providing more 
evidence that the Seventh Circuit’s narrow interpretation was 
mistaken.97 
When the Fair Housing Act was enacted in 1968, it only 
prohibited discrimination in the “sale, rental and financing” of 
housing on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin.”98 In 1988, the Fair Housing Act was amended to 
increase the number of protected classes and to provide better 
guidelines for enforcement of the statute and the rights 
provided therein.99 The amendments extended the guarantees 
of the statute to cover individuals with disabilities and to 
protect against discrimination on the basis of familial status.100 
Initially, the statute contained no mention of the concept of 
“accommodation” for any of the protected classes, but with the 
  
 94 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619; see also Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 565; Hack v. 
President of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2000).  
 95 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.  
 96 42 U.S.C. § 3601.  
 97 See infra note 106 and accompanying text.  
 98 The Fair Housing Act, supra note 76. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
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1988 amendment, a clause was added that stated that “a 
refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, 
practices, or services, when such accommodations may be 
necessary to afford such person equal opportunity to use and 
enjoy a dwelling,” constituted discrimination against 
individuals on the basis of a handicap.101 Accordingly, 
accommodations for handicapped individuals must be made 
where the modification is necessary for the individual to use 
and fully enjoy the dwelling and the modification does not pose 
an undue cost or administrative burden.102 
Although the accommodation clause of the Fair Housing 
Act appears only under the requirements for providing housing 
to individuals with handicaps, whether this distinction was 
intended is unclear. Specifically, it is unclear whether Congress 
intended for the accommodation language to apply 
retroactively to all forms of discrimination prohibited by the 
statute. In fact, there are indications that this intent was 
present, since to provide otherwise would inhibit the stated 
purpose of the statute, “to provide . . . for fair housing 
throughout the United States.”103  
In Bloch I, the Seventh Circuit indicated that because 
the word “accommodate” only appears under the requirements 
for handicaps, Congress intended the word “discriminate” to 
have a distinctly different meaning than “failure to 
accommodate.”104 However, although the Seventh Circuit is 
correct that the statutory language does not equate 
“discrimination” and “failure to accommodate,” and that not all 
failures to accommodate would rise to the level of 
discrimination, there may be instances where a failure to 
accommodate does reach the level of discrimination. Thus, the 
question of whether an accommodation requirement does, or 
should, exist for the protected class of religious individuals 
becomes central to analyzing whether the conduct of the 
Shoreline Towers Condominium Association rose to the level of 
  
 101 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). 
 102 The cost of the accommodation must also be paid for by the individual 
requiring the modification. Id. § 3604(f)(3)(A)-(B). 
 103 Id. § 3601(1). 
 104 Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), 533 F.3d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 2008), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 771 (7 Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“It would be especially 
inappropriate to adopt in the name of the Fair Housing Act a principle that lack of 
accommodation = discrimination, since the FHA itself distinguishes the two. By 
requiring accommodation of handicap but not race, sex, or religion, the statute’s 
structure tells us that the FHA uses the word ‘discriminate’ to mean something other 
than ‘failure to accommodate.’”). 
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discrimination. By incorrectly granting summary judgment, 
the Seventh Circuit did not reach this key question. 
Case law in the Seventh Circuit is consistent with this 
narrow interpretation of the language of the Fair Housing Act, 
but Supreme Court precedent is not. The Seventh Circuit has 
routinely refused to look beyond the words of the Fair Housing 
Act to the legislative history to give additional breadth to the 
statute.105 In contrast, the Supreme Court has held that the 
Fair Housing Act should be interpreted broadly and has looked 
to the legislative history in assessing procedural Fair Housing 
Act questions.106 It is reasonable, therefore, to suggest that the 
congressional intent of the statute may require a broader 
interpretation of the statute’s language than the words alone 
may indicate.  
The Blochs’ request to display their mezuzah may be 
construed as a request for an accommodation to a facially 
neutral rule. Although a right to accommodation is not 
explicitly conferred in the statute, such a right may be implicit, 
given the law’s purpose. To begin, the Blochs merely requested 
the right to display their mezuzah in their doorway. 
Accommodation of this request would not cost the 
condominium association any money, present any 
administrative burden to change the rule, nor make an 
exception for the display of religiously-mandated objects.107 In 
  
 105 See, e.g., Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 
388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Reference to legislative history is criticized when it 
is used to give a statute a reach that exceeds what its words suggest. Our use here is 
the opposite; it is to confirm that the words mean what they seem to mean.”). It is a 
Seventh Circuit trend to advocate for “plain meaning” interpretation of statutes. Judge 
Easterbrook, who writes for the majority in Bloch I, routinely advocates for narrowing 
the scope of statutory interpretation with his philosophy of “new textualism.” 
Easterbrook believes that “it is misleading to speak of legislative intent,” and, as a 
result, he has advocated for “a limit on the use of legislative history.” James E. 
Westbrook, A Comparison of the Interpretation of Statutes and Collective Bargaining 
Agreements: Grasping the Pivot of Tao, 60 MO. L. REV. 283, 287-88 (1995). Similarly, 
Judge Posner has “caution[ed] against judicial reliance upon broad statutory purpose.” 
Id. 
 106 See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731 (1995) 
(noting awareness of “the [Fair Housing] Act’s stated policy ‘to provide, within 
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States’” and 
“precedent recognizing the FHA’s ‘broad and inclusive’ compass, and therefore 
according a ‘generous construction’ to the Act’s complaint-filing provision”) (quoting 
Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1972) (assessing the standing 
of complainants to bring suits under the Fair Housing Act)); see also Griffen v. 
Breckinridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1971) (acknowledging that the Court has broadly 
interpreted all civil rights statutes). 
 107 The requested accommodation therefore meets the statutory requirements 
for accommodation as laid out for handicaps. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(A)-(B). 
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addition, failure to accommodate this request prevents the 
Blochs from “enjoy[ing their] dwelling,”108 further rendering it 
unusable to them. The words of the Fair Housing Act explicitly 
state that it is unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent . . . or 
otherwise make unavailable” a dwelling on the basis of 
religion.109 Contrary to the holding in Bloch II,110 the Shoreline 
Towers Condominium Association’s hallway rule effectively 
made the condominiums unavailable to observant Jewish 
individuals who are required by the tenets of their religion to 
display a mezuzah in the doorway of their homes. Although the 
Blochs did not move out of their condo, as the Seventh Circuit 
asserts would necessarily need to be shown here for a claim of 
constructive eviction,111 the hallway rule’s treatment of 
observant Jews is discrimination on the basis of religion—the 
exact conduct the Fair Housing Act prohibits.112 In fact, despite 
the finding that the Blochs’ home was not made “unavailable,” 
the court in Bloch II specifically acknowledged that “Section 
3604(a) is designed to ensure that no one is denied the right to 
live where they choose for discriminatory reasons,”113 a 
proposition aptly describing the situation facing the Blochs. If a 
facially neutral rule results in a discriminatory impact on 
people’s religion, there should be a cause of action under the 
Fair Housing Act, even if no duty exists to accommodate for 
religious observance.114 
  
 108 Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B). 
 109 Id. § 3604(a) (emphasis added). The full text of this clause states that it 
shall be unlawful, “To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to 
refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a 
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national 
origin.” Id. 
 110 Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch II), 587 F.3d 771, 777-78 (7th Cir. 2009); see 
supra note 62 and accompanying text. The en banc decision asserts that “[w]hether 
‘unavailability’ means that a plaintiff must, in every case, vacate the premises to have 
a § 3604(a) claim is an issue we refrain from reaching.” Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 778. Yet 
despite this statement, that is precisely the onus put on the Blochs, as the court noted 
“the Blochs never moved out [and] gave no reason why they failed to vacate,” and 
concluded that “based on these facts, we see no possibility that a reasonable jury could 
conclude that the defendants’ conduct rendered Shoreline Towers ‘unavailable’ to the 
Blochs.” Id. 
 111 Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 777-78; see supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 112 The en banc decision noted that “if the Blochs produced sufficient evidence 
of discrimination, we conclude that § 3604(b) could support the Blochs’ claim,” yet the 
court never reached this issue. Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 781. 
 113 Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 776 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass’n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 
(7th Cir. 1984)).  
 114 See Hack v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 103-04 (2d Cir. 
2000) (Moran, J., dissenting) (asserting that although the college may not be compelled 
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Similarly, the Fair Housing Act makes it unlawful to 
“coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in 
the exercise or enjoyment of . . . any right granted or protected 
by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of [the Act].”115 Section 
3604 makes it unlawful to discriminate against individuals in 
the sale, rental, and privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling on 
the basis of religion.116 Seventh Circuit case law interpreting 
this clause of the Fair Housing Act has prohibited harassment 
that amounts to constructive eviction, analogizing such conduct 
to constructive discharge, which is prohibited under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act.117 In the case of the Blochs, their inability 
to display their mezuzah in their doorway was constructive 
eviction because they were no longer able to live in their 
condominium and simultaneously adhere to the rules of their 
religion. At least one other tenant in Shoreline felt similarly, as 
she moved out and told her neighbors that she had “essentially 
been evicted from her home.”118 Because of Shoreline’s 
persistent removal of the mezuzot from the Blochs’ doorway 
and prevention of Lynn’s display of a mezuzah while she was 
mourning the death of her husband, these actions may be 
classified as harassment and result in a cause of action under 
the Fair Housing Act, which various courts in the country have 
allowed.119  
Finally, although § 3604 does not explicitly address 
post-acquisition discrimination,120 hindrance of one’s ability to 
  
by the Fair Housing Act to make religious accommodations, where plaintiff makes a 
prima facie showing of the unavailability of housing to observant Jewish students, the 
case should proceed to discovery and be left to the fact finder to determine whether the 
rule has had a discriminatory effect). 
 115 42 U.S.C. § 3617. 
 116 Id. § 3604(a)-(b). 
 117 DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1996). For a more in-
depth discussion of the parallels between Title VII constructive discharge claims and 
the potential for creating a Title VII constructive eviction cause of action, see infra Part 
III.C. 
 118 Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), 533 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2008) (Wood, J., 
dissenting), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir 2009) (en banc). 
 119 DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1008 (noting that several other courts have found 
harassment to be an actionable form of housing discrimination (citing Beliveau v. 
Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393, 1396-97 (C.D. Cal. 1995); People v. Merlino, 694 F. Supp. 
1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1988))). 
 120 In Bloch II, the Seventh Circuit created a case for a claim of post-
acquisition discrimination under § 3604 when it noted that, “[a]s a purely semantic 
matter the statutory language [of Section 3604(a)] might be stretched far enough to 
reach a case of ‘constructive eviction.’” Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch II), 587 F.3d 771, 776 
(7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Halprin v. Prairie Single 
Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2004)). The court 
went on to explicitly state that “§ 3604(a) may reach post-acquisition discriminatory 
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enjoy the rights guaranteed in this section can take place after 
acquisition of the dwelling, creating a cause of action under 
§ 3617, which prohibits coercion, intimidation, and interference 
with one’s enjoyment of his dwelling.121 While the Seventh 
Circuit has “routinely reserved” the issue of whether a plaintiff 
may assert a cause of action under § 3617 even in the absence 
of violations of §§ 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606,122 at least two 
courts have found a valid cause of action in these 
circumstances.123 Furthermore, as the United States pointed out 
in its amicus brief to the Seventh Circuit prior to the en banc 
re-hearing, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development has itself interpreted the Fair Housing Act to 
apply to “post-acquisition discrimination.”124 Affording Chevron 
deference to HUD’s interpretation of the Fair Housing Act 
forces the conclusion that “post-acquisition discrimination” is 
protected under the Act.125 
Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s consideration of the Blochs’ 
Fair Housing Act claims in both Bloch I and II wrongly 
affirmed the grant of summary judgment because they failed to 
fully and properly consider the various theories discussed 
herein that would support a cause of action for discrimination 
under the Fair Housing Act. A look into the congressional 
intent of the Fair Housing Act reveals that, in order to achieve 
the stated goal of the statute, a broader interpretation of the 
statutory language is necessary.126 The discriminatory 
  
conduct that makes a dwelling unavailable to the owner or tenant, somewhat like a 
constructive eviction.” Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 776. However, finding no “unavailability” 
here, the Blochs’ claim under § 3604(a) was dismissed.  
 121 See Halprin, 388 F.3d at 330. 
 122 Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 781.  
 123 See United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 978-79 (D. Neb. 2004); 
Stackhouse v. DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208, 210 (N.D. Ill. 1985). Additionally, in Bloch II, 
the Seventh Circuit stated that “a § 3617 claim might stand on its own,” and in 
applying that idea to the Blochs, noted that a claim under this section could only 
prevail after proof of intentional discrimination, an issue remanded for determination 
at trial. Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 782-83. Once discrimination was established, the Blochs 
would be able to proceed under § 3617, but that issue has yet to be reached. Id. 
 124 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants Urging Reversal and Remand on Fair Housing Act Claims at 32, Bloch v. 
Frischholz, 533 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3376) (citing 24 C.F.R. 100.400(c)(2) 
and 24 C.F.R. 100.65(b)(4)).  
 125 Id. at 33 (citing Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 
837 (1984)). Chevron sets forth a legal test for determining whether deference should 
be given to a government agency’s interpretation of their statutory law. See Chevron, 
467 U.S. 837. Deference is given to the agency when a statute is ambiguous and the 
agency’s interpretation is reasonable. See id. 
 126 The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of expanding the scope 
of interpretation of the Civil Right Act of 1964. See Griffen v. Breckinridge, 403 U.S. 
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treatment to which the Blochs were subject is exactly the type 
of conduct that the Fair Housing Act seeks to prohibit, and by 
granting summary judgment, the Seventh Circuit effectively 
undermined the ability of the Fair Housing Act to “provide . . . 
fair housing throughout the United States.”127 
B. The Necessity for Religious Accommodation Under the 
First Amendment  
While the Fair Housing Act may not explicitly require 
religious accommodation, the question of whether the First 
Amendment requires such an accommodation in the housing 
context is a separate but equally important issue. As discussed 
in Part II, the First Amendment is implicated here because 
housing discrimination occurred on the basis of religion. 
Analyzing how courts have dealt with religious accommodation 
in other contexts sheds some light on whether the situation in 
Bloch was appropriately analyzed under the First Amendment. 
First Amendment jurisprudence, specifically the religious 
accommodation requirement of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act,128 demonstrates that not only would a parallel requirement 
under the Fair Housing Act be constitutional, but it would also 
further the Act’s goals. In failing to recognize the necessity of a 
religious accommodation requirement under the First 
Amendment, the Seventh Circuit panel in Bloch I rashly and 
inappropriately granted summary judgment, and only partially 
nullified the effects of this harsh judgment in Bloch II by 
remanding the case in part, underscoring the need for action.  
The religion line of the First Amendment is generally 
analyzed as two separate clauses—the Free Exercise Clause 
and the Establishment Clause.129 The Free Exercise Clause 
prohibits the creation of laws that burden the practice of 
  
88, 97-98 (1971) (acknowledging that the Court has broadly interpreted Civil Rights 
statutes); see also supra note 106 and accompanying text.  
 127 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006). While Bloch II leaves open the possibility for the 
Blochs to establish claims under § 3604(b) and § 3617 if a finding of intentional 
discrimination is made on remand, no relief is presently available to the Blochs under 
the Fair Housing Act without further litigation pending a favoring outcome on remand. 
Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 781, 783. 
 128 Id. § 2000e-1 to -17. 
 129 The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment state, “Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof 
. . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first ten words of the Amendment have been deemed 
the “Establishment Clause” and the remainder the “Free Exercise Clause.” See Everson 
v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947). 
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religion, while the Establishment Clause prohibits the 
government from promoting or showing favoritism towards one 
religion.130 When a law places an incidental burden on the 
practice of religion, the Free Exercise Clause merely requires 
that such a law be neutral and generally applicable in order to 
be deemed constitutional.131 When this test cannot be met and a 
law is not religiously neutral, the government must prove that 
the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government 
interest and is narrowly-tailored to meet this interest.132 
Finally, the government must prove that the achievement of 
the interest at stake would be undermined by the creation of a 
religious exception to the rule.133 Similarly, the Establishment 
Clause forbids a law from promoting or disadvantaging any 
particular religion.134 The Supreme Court has stated that there 
are three ways of proving that a law suppresses religion or 
religious conduct: (1) the law is facially biased; (2) the law 
targets one or more religious groups; or (3) the law prohibits 
more conduct than is necessary to achieve the stated 
compelling government interest.135 
The Shoreline Towers Condominium Association rule 
violates the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and may 
be deemed unconstitutional under two of the theories that the 
Supreme Court has approved for proving that the purpose of a 
law is to suppress religious conduct. First, the condominium 
rule targets a religious group. While not expressly targeting 
Jews, the rule effectively prohibits observant Jews from living 
at Shoreline Towers in accordance with the tenets of their 
religion. As Justice Wood pointed out in her dissent in Bloch I, 
just as a rule that forbids individuals from wearing 
headscarves in the common areas of the condominium would 
single out observant Muslim women whose religion requires 
them to cover their heads, so too does the prohibition of the 
display of religiously mandated objects in the doorways of one’s 
home disproportionately affect observant Jews.136 Second, the 
  
 130 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 131 See Employment Div. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 
(1990). 
 132 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 530 
(1993). 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 532 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990)). 
 135 See id. at 533-38. 
 136 Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), 533 F.3d 562, 573 (7th Cir. 2008) (Wood, J., 
dissenting) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
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hallway rule prohibits more conduct than is necessary to 
achieve the Association’s stated goal of maintaining an 
attractive hallway appearance.137 This objective could be 
achieved by less restrictive means. Moreover, it could be 
achieved even if there was a religious exception to the rule 
permitting Jews or any other religious group that requires such 
an accommodation to display mezuzot or the like in their 
doorways.  
In sum, the condominium association rule violates the 
Free Exercise Clause under the factors enumerated by the 
Supreme Court. On the other hand, a religious accommodation 
requirement in the housing context would be constitutionally 
permissible. In fact, religious accommodation would be in line 
with the legislative approach to religion in the employment 
context, a world where religious accommodation is not merely 
permissible, but is required.138 Even if religious accommodation 
in the housing context is out of line with the congressional 
intent of the Fair Housing Act, the subsequent sections assert 
that religious accommodation is necessary, at least in certain 
situations. These situations exist where, like in the case at bar, 
the rule in question has a disparate impact on one specific 
religious group, observant Jews, and is therefore in violation of 
both the First Amendment and the Fair Housing Act. In such 
an instance, religious accommodation is necessary regardless of 
whether the drafters of the Fair Housing Act envisioned the 
law to operate in this way.  
C. Religious Accommodation and Title VII Employment 
Claims 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employment 
discrimination on the “basis of race, color, religion, sex, and 
national origin.”139 The Supreme Court has held that it is 
constitutionally permissible for the government to order 
employers, under this Act, to accommodate employees’ religious 
  
 137 See Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 9, Bloch v. Frischholz, 533 F.3d 562 
(7th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3376). 
 138 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006); see also EEOC, RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION 
(2009), http://www.eeoc.gov/types/religion.html [hereinafter RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION]. 
This assertion builds off the previous section’s argument that religious accommodation is 
in line with the congressional intent of the Fair Housing Act. See supra Part III.C. 
 139 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
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needs.140 This section seeks to explain how religious 
accommodation is handled under the Title VII mandate, and 
argues that creating a similar requirement under Title VIII, 
the Fair Housing Act, would function similarly and be 
constitutionally permissible.  
The Supreme Court has held that the Title VII religious 
accommodation requirement does not violate the 
Establishment Clause, because it does not promote or advance 
religion, but rather merely permits religious exercise.141 The 
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”), the agency responsible for enforcing Title VII and 
investigating alleged violations of the statute, created the 
religious accommodation requirement, which now requires that 
“[e]mployers must reasonably accommodate employees’ 
sincerely held religious practices unless doing so would impose 
an undue hardship on the employer.”142 The EEOC has defined 
a religious accommodation to be “any adjustment to the work 
environment that will allow the employee to practice his 
religion.”143 Such adjustments include flexible scheduling, task 
reassignments, and modification of grooming requirements and 
agency policies, practices, and procedures, including permitting 
religious expression.144 The only exception to this requirement is 
if such an accommodation would “legitimately” harm the 
interests of the business.145  
The adoption of religious accommodation practices in 
the housing context would be no more violative of the First 
Amendment than would the parallel requirement in the 
employment context, which the Supreme Court has long upheld 
as constitutional.146 A religious accommodation requirement is 
necessary to provide homeowners with the same protections 
that the EEOC requirement of religious accommodation 
provides to employees. Such an accommodation, as long as it is 
tailored in a manner similar to Title VII, should not violate the 
  
 140 See Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (“This 
Court has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) 
accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the 
Establishment Clause.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hobbie v. 
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987))).  
 141 See id. 
 142 RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION, supra note 138. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 See Amos, 483 U.S. at 335. 
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Establishment Clause. To the contrary, it would further the 
goal of the Free Exercise Clause of preventing the burdening of 
religious exercise,147 because such an accommodation would 
enable homeowners to be free from the fear that they may be 
constructively evicted from their homes due to rules that 
inhibit their ability to practice their religion in their homes.  
The Title VII religious accommodation requirement has 
interpreted the word “religion” to include “all aspects of 
religious observance and practice, as well as belief.”148 In order 
to establish a religious accommodation claim under Title VII, 
the claim must be assessed under a two-step framework.149 
First, the claimant must establish a prima facie case by 
proving that: (1) he has a “bona fide religious belief” that 
conflicts with one or more of his employment duties; (2) he 
informed the employer of the belief and conflict; and (3) as a 
result of the conflict, he was subject to adverse employment 
consequences.150 If all of these requirements are met, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to show that accommodation 
would create an undue burden for the company.151 
Employers are required to make religious 
accommodations for both employees and prospective employees, 
so long as such an accommodation does not result in “undue 
hardship.”152 However, the level of undue hardship necessary to 
overcome the religious accommodation requirement is not 
clear. The Ninth Circuit found in Garbers v. Postmaster 
General that forcing an employer to pay extra overtime wages 
was an undue hardship justifying the employer’s refusal to 
provide a Baptist employee additional time off to attend 
ministerial meetings twice a month.153 That court defined undue 
hardship as “result[ing] in more than a de minimis cost to the 
employer.”154 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that 
when an employer takes reasonable steps to accommodate an 
  
 147 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 148 Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 73 (1977). 
 149 Garbers v. Postmaster Gen., No. 94-15557, 1995 WL 241474, at *1 (9th Cir. 
Apr. 24, 1995).  
 150 See id. at *1; see also Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., No. 96-2408, 1997 WL 
741368, at *2-3 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 1997).  
 151 Johnson, 1997 WL 741368, at *1; see also Garbers, 1995 WL 241474, at *1.  
 152 Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 74. 
 153 Garbers, 1995 WL 241474, at *1 (holding that having to pay 12% in 
overtime constituted an undue burden to employer overcoming his duty to 
accommodate employee’s religious beliefs). 
 154 Id. (citing Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1440 (9th Cir. 1993)); see 
also Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 84. 
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employee’s religious beliefs, the requirement may be met even 
though no solution was ultimately found.155  
In addition, employees may bring Title VII claims 
alleging “constructive discharge.”156 Such a situation occurs 
when “a reasonable person in the employee’s position would 
have felt that he was forced to quit because of intolerable and 
discriminatory working conditions.”157 This type of claim 
requires a plaintiff to establish that the employer deliberately 
created intolerable working conditions to compel the employee 
to quit.158 Intent is demonstrated through evidence that the 
employee’s resignation was a “reasonably foreseeable 
consequence” of the employer’s failure to act when he becomes 
aware of the condition.159  
Under Title VII’s framework for religious 
accommodation, it appears that the Blochs’ claim of 
discrimination would be strong enough to establish a violation. 
Under the two-step framework, the Blochs have established a 
prima facie case of discrimination, and there is no proof that 
providing religious accommodation would cause any hardship 
for the Shoreline Towers Condominium Association. First, the 
Blochs have proven that they have a “bona fide religious belief” 
that conflicts with the rule in question.160 The Jewish religion 
requires that individuals display mezuzot in the doorways of 
their homes at all times.161 The hallway rule that Shoreline 
adopted in the spring of 2004 may be interpreted as including a 
prohibition on the display of mezuzot on the exterior doors of 
the condominiums.162 This rule necessarily interfered with the 
Blochs’ practice of their religion, and the Blochs appropriately 
  
 155 See Trans World Airlines, 432 U.S. at 78-79 (holding that no violation of 
Title VII occurred where an airline provided a religious employee with multiple 
alternatives to working on Saturdays, despite the fact that none were ultimately found 
to be suitable; the Court found that the accommodation that the employee wanted 
would have posed an undue burden, and because employee had been given 
accommodating options, Title VII was not violated). 
 156 Garbers, 1995 WL 241474, at *1. 
 157 Id. at *2 (quoting Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360, 361 (9th 
Cir. 1987)); see also Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., No. 96-2408, 1997 WL 741368, at *3 (4th 
Cir. Dec. 2, 1997) (defining constructive discharge as the situation where “an employer 
deliberately makes the working conditions of the employee intolerable in an effort to 
induce the employee to quit” (internal citations omitted)). 
 158 See Johnson, 1997 WL 741368, at *1. 
 159 Id. 
 160 See Garbers, 1995 WL 241474, at *1. 
 161 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
 162 Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), 533 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2008) (Wood, J., 
dissenting) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
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contacted Shoreline about the problem, providing them with 
information explaining the religious significance of a 
mezuzah.163 Finally, the Blochs suffered adverse consequences 
as a result of the conflict between the hallway rule and their 
religious practices.164 The Blochs suffered emotional distress as 
a direct result of both this conflict and their internal struggle 
between wanting to live in their home and adhering to the 
tenets of their religion.165 Furthermore, there was no showing 
that the condominium association would have suffered any 
hardship at all,166 let alone an “undue hardship,” by 
accommodating the religious beliefs of the Blochs and other 
Jewish unit owners.167 The alleged goal of the hallway rule was 
to “protect the appearance of the hallways,”168 and there was 
neither a showing that this goal would be undermined by a 
religious-accommodation exception to the rule, nor that the 
condominium association would suffer any hardship as a 
result. 
The Shoreline Towers Condominium Association did not 
even offer accommodation alternatives with which the Blochs 
may have been satisfied.169 Instead, they entirely refused to 
accommodate their religious beliefs.170 One tenant described the 
  
 163 Id. As the amicus brief submitted in support of Plaintiff-Appellants notes, 
many Jews believe they are biblically required to place a mezuzah in the doorway of 
their home because it is “a sacred piece of iconography meticulously presented in their 
doorway in accordance with [G-d’s] law.” Brief of Amicus Curiae the Decalogue Society 
of Lawyers in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4, Bloch v. Frischholz, 533 F.3d 562 
(7th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3376) (“Because an observant Jew cannot live in a home without 
a mezuzah, forcibly removing one from an adherent’s doorway is tantamount to 
eviction.”). 
 164 Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 567 (Wood, J., dissenting); see also Garbers, 1995 WL 
241474, at *2-3. 
 165 See Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 567 (Wood, J., dissenting); Amended Complaint at 
¶ 41-42, Bloch v. Frischholz (N.D. Ill. 2006) (No. 06 C 4472). 
 166 While arguably Shoreline Towers Condominium Association could assert 
that mezuzot are not aesthetically pleasing, and thus cause the Association hardship, it 
seems unlikely that a court could legitimately characterize aesthetic concerns as 
excessive enough to warrant being deemed “undue hardship.” Trans World Airlines, 
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). This seems especially true in light of 
seriousness that the Supreme Court has required in order to show that an 
accommodation poses “undue hardship,” that is, proof that the accommodation would 
pose “more than a de minimis cost” to the accommodator. See id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Response Brief of the Defendants-Appellees at 9, Bloch v. Frischholz, 533 
F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3376). 
 169 See supra notes 142-145 and accompanying text.  
 170 Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 568 (Wood, J., dissenting). In September 2004, Lynne 
Bloch approached the condominium board with a proposed amendment to the hallway 
rule that would allow the display of religiously-mandated objects, including mezuzot, on 
the doorframes, but her proposal was rejected. Id.  
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effect of the rule on her life by stating that she had “essentially 
been evicted from her home.”171 This allegation of constructive 
eviction is analogous to claims of constructive discharge, which 
are actionable under Title VII.172 Here, observant Jewish 
condominium owners were placed in a situation where they felt 
forced to move out of their homes because of intolerable 
discriminatory housing practices.173 Just as such a claim would 
be actionable under Title VII, a similar remedy should be 
available for individuals who are placed in an analogous 
situation by discriminatory housing practices. 
The constitutionality of the religious accommodation 
requirement of Title VII has been established.174 Creating a 
similar requirement for Title VIII, the Fair Housing Act, would 
similarly pass the First Amendment’s requirements of neither 
promoting nor advancing religion, and would foster the free 
exercise of religion. As discussed, if an analogous framework 
were in place for assessing violations of the Fair Housing Act 
as is in place for determining whether violations of Title VII 
have occurred, the Blochs could potentially have two causes of 
action. First, it seems that the Blochs would easily be able to 
make out a prima facie case of discrimination that the 
defendants would be unable to overcome by proof of undue 
hardship. In addition, the hallway rule resulted in constructive 
eviction of Jewish condominium owners because they can no 
longer display their mezuzot, in accordance with the tenets of 
their religion.175 As a result, constructive eviction could 
potentially be an independent cause of action as well.176 
Creating a religious accommodation requirement for the Fair 
Housing Act would properly allow discrimination in the 
housing market to be overcome by the most fair and efficient 
means possible. The religious accommodation requirement has 
fostered non-discrimination in the employment context as 
  
 171 Id. 
 172 See Johnson v. K-Mart Corp., No. 96-2408, 1997 WL 741368, at *1 (4th Cir. 
Dec. 2, 1997).  
 173 Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 568 (Wood, J., dissenting); see also Garbers, 1995 WL 
241474, at *7-8. 
 174 Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).  
 175 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
 176 The Blochs’ potential constructive eviction claim referenced here would be 
distinct from claims of constructive eviction under § 3604(a) and § 3604(b) of the Fair 
Housing Act, discussed in Part III.A, as the claim here would stem from the Religious 
Accommodation Clause for which this section advocates.  
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efficiently as possible, and so too could such a requirement in 
the housing market.  
D. The Seventh Circuit’s Failure to Reach Disparate Impact 
Analysis  
The Seventh Circuit further erred in analyzing the 
situation presented in Bloch by failing to assess the disparate 
impact that the hallway rule had on observant Jews. While the 
court in Bloch I completely ignored the potential for a disparate 
impact claim, in Bloch II the court explained that it believed 
that the Blochs waived their ability to argue disparate impact, 
because they did not raise it during the summary judgment 
phase of the proceedings.177 The court acknowledged that the 
Blochs used the term “disparate impact” in their pleadings and 
cited the seminal case on disparate impact in their sur-reply, 
but concluded that it was not enough to entitle them to 
disparate impact analysis on their claims.178 However, if the 
court had reached the Blochs disparate impact claim and 
looked at Fair Housing Act and First Amendment 
jurisprudence, it would have become clear that the Blochs had 
a legitimate disparate impact claim since the hallway rule had 
a disparate impact on Jewish residents, substantially 
burdening their ability to freely practice their religion, without 
any legitimate reason for doing so. In deciding that the Blochs 
waived their disparate impact claims, both Seventh Circuit 
decisions never engaged in enough analysis to recognize that 
clear issues of material fact existed as to the disparate impact 
of the hallway rule on observant Jews.179 
A Fair Housing Act violation can be established by a 
showing of disparate impact or disparate treatment.180 
  
 177 Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch II), 587 F.3d 771, 784 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 178 Id. at 784-85 (“Accordingly, we conclude that the Blochs waived any 
Arlington Heights disparate impact argument. So the Blochs must proceed on a 
showing on intentional discrimination.”). 
 179 By limiting the remanded case to the issue of intentional discrimination 
and not allowing the Blochs to proceed on the additional claim of disparate impact, one 
of their potential avenues of relief was made unavailable to them.  
 180 Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934-35 
(2d Cir. 1988), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); see also Hack v. President of Yale Coll., 237 
F.3d 81, 96-97 (2d Cir. 2000) (Moran, J. dissenting) (noting that “the existence of 
disparate impact claim under Title VIII was implicitly confirmed when the Supreme 
Court announced its decision in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing 
Development Corporation.”) (citing 429 U.S. 252 (1977)). The circuits, however, are not 
in agreement as to whether mere proof of disparate impact alone is enough to establish 
a Fair Housing Act violation. While some circuits have found violations of the Act in 
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Similarly, a violation of the First Amendment may also be 
established by showing that a rule is facially discriminatory or 
has a disparate impact on one or more religious groups.181 Proof 
of disparate impact requires a totality of circumstances 
analysis, for example, an investigation into the background of 
the decision, the sequence of events leading up to the decision, 
and the factors the decision-maker considered.182 In order to 
prove discriminatory impact under the Fair Housing Act, there 
must be a showing that the ultimate effect of the law or rule is 
disproportionately placed on one group.183 If discriminatory 
impact is present but discriminatory intent cannot be readily 
proven, the analysis of whether the rule is discriminatory 
under the Fair Housing Act becomes more complicated. 
Although Fair Housing Act claims are dramatically easier to 
prove when both discriminatory intent and effect can be shown, 
violations of Title VII, as discussed, are often established based 
on evidence of discriminatory impact, even without a showing 
of discriminatory intent.184 Thus, whether the additional 
requirement of proving discriminatory intent is necessary for 
establishing a violation of the Fair Housing Act, or for 
establishing whether the conduct is in violation of the First 
Amendment, must be assessed.  
Under the Fair Housing Act, when discriminatory effect 
can be established but discriminatory intent cannot, a claim 
that a violation has occurred is not necessarily void. Instead, it 
just becomes much more difficult to prove.185 The Act requires 
that in order for a violation to be found in such a case, the 
  
the absence of proof that the defendant intended to discriminate, others have found 
effect alone to be insufficient. Compare Huntington Branch, NAACP, 844 F.2d at 934-
35, with Dirden v. Dep’t. of Hous. and Urban Dev., 86 F.3d 112, 114 (8th Cir. 1996) (“To 
prevail on a claim under . . . . the Fair Housing Act . . . a plaintiff must prove 
discriminatory intent.”) and Vill. of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1534 (7th Cir. 
1990) (“But discriminatory effect is not . . . the violation; it is merely evidence of 
violation.”). 
 181 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533-
38 (1993). 
 182 See Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267-68. 
 183 United States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 
1974) (holding that discriminatory effect was established where an ordinance led to 
foreclosure for 85 percent of the African Americans living in the area). 
 184 United States v. City of Chi., 549 F.2d 415, 435 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing 
Wash. v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976)). 
 185 See City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F.2d at 1186; see also supra note 180. But 
see Hack, 237 F.3d at 96-97 (Moran, J. dissenting) (citing Resident Advisory Bd. v. 
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 128 (3d Cir. 1977) and noting that the Third Circuit has held that 
proof of discriminatory effect alone is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of 
disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act). 
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claimant must establish that the action was taken “because of 
religion.”186 The broad view of this requirement is that an action 
can be shown to have been taken on the basis of religion 
wherever claimant can prove that the “natural and foreseeable 
consequence” of the action is discrimination, regardless of 
intent.187 The narrow view, however, is that in order to meet 
this requirement, intent needs to actually be proved.188 Even 
after this requirement is met, some courts proceed to consider 
four factors to fully determine whether a violation of § 3604(a), 
the section prohibiting discrimination in the sale and rental of 
dwellings, has occurred.189 The factors to be assessed are: (1) the 
strength of the showing of the discriminatory effect; (2) 
whether there is any showing of discriminatory intent at all; (3) 
the defendant’s interest in taking the action; and (4) whether 
the plaintiff is looking to get the court to make an affirmative 
holding that the defendant must provide housing for minorities 
or whether he seeks merely to prevent the defendant from 
interfering with the right of individual property owners.190  
First Amendment analysis of whether facially neutral 
laws are discriminatory on the basis of religion is approached 
differently. Facially neutral laws are assessed under a 
rationality standard: does the rule infringe on the free exercise 
of religion?191 Even if a facially neutral law of general 
applicability does infringe on religious practice, the Supreme 
Court has only applied strict scrutiny where other 
constitutional protections were at issue as well,192 or where it 
could be shown that the rule was not actually “neutral,” 
because its object was “to infringe upon or restrict practices.”193 
  
 186 See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 
1290 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding discriminatory effect in the absence of discriminatory 
intent in the case of zoning ordinances prohibiting the construction of federally 
financed low-income housing); 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006).  
 187 See id. at 1288. 
 188 See id. 
 189 See id. at 1290. 
 190 Id.  
 191 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).  
 192 See id. at 881-82 (citing numerous cases including West Virginia Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (deeming a statute compelling students to salute 
the flag to be unconstitutional when challenged by religious objectors); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 206 (1972) (invalidating compulsory schooling laws as applied to 
Amish Parents who objected on religious grounds after the Court upheld the right of 
parents to direct the education of their children in Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925))).  
 193 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 
(1993). 
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Congress, however, did not approve of the rational basis test, 
and voiced its disapproval by passing the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”).194  
RFRA prevented the government from “substantially 
burdening” religious practice even where the burden resulted 
from a generally applicable rule.195 The exception to this was 
that if the government could demonstrate that the burden was 
in furtherance of a “compelling government interest,” and that 
the restriction was the least restrictive means of achieving the 
interest, then the rule could be upheld.196 One of the stated 
goals of RFRA was to provide a cause of action for people whose 
religious exercise was unnecessarily burdened by the 
government.197 The Supreme Court, however, struck down 
RFRA in City of Boerne v. Flores,198 holding that the law created 
a separation of powers issue because it exceeded Congress’ 
remedial powers.199  
In a second attempt to remedy what Congress saw as an 
injustice in denying individuals the rights guaranteed to them 
by the First Amendment, Congress passed the Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).200 This Act 
was also constitutionally challenged, but the Supreme Court 
upheld the statute,201 exemplifying the fact that religious 
accommodation statutes do not automatically violate the 
Establishment Clause. RLUIPA is a narrower version of RFRA 
that prohibits the government from imposing “substantial” 
burdens on the religious exercise of any institutionalized 
individual unless there is a compelling government interest 
and the restriction is the least restrictive means of achieving 
the interest.202 In the face of allegations that RLUIPA 
  
 194 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to -4 (1993) (this statute’s application to local and 
state governments was later declared unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507 (1997)).  
 195 Id. § 2000bb. 
 196 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 515-16 (discussing the intent of RFRA 
before deeming it unconstitutional).  
 197 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb.  
 198 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  
 199 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (noting that “RFRA contradicts vital 
principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance”); see 
also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715 (2005) (explaining that “this Court 
invalidated RFRA as applied to States and their subdivisions, holding that the Act 
exceeded Congress’ remedial powers under the Fourteenth Amendment”).  
 200 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1 to -5.  
 201 See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719-26 (holding that the protections granted by 
RLUIPA did not violate the Establishment Clause).  
 202 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2); see also Cutter, 544 U.S. at 712.  
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effectively advanced religion, in conflict with the 
Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court upheld the statute. 
In Cutter v. Wilkinson,203 the Supreme Court found RLUIPA to 
be constitutional because there was “no cause to believe 
RLUIPA would not be applied in an appropriately balanced 
way”204 given the “compelling governmental interest” exception, 
and the fact that it “does not differentiate among bona fide 
faiths.”205 The Court recognized RLUIPA to be a continuation of 
“congressional efforts to accord religious exercise heightened 
protection from government-imposed burdens, consistent with 
this Court’s precedents.”206 Thus, the Supreme Court adeptly 
observed Congress’ discontent with the limited protections that 
the rationality standard advanced in Employment Division v. 
Smith207 provided to religious individuals in the face of 
governmental action stymieing individuals’ ability to practice 
freely.208  
In Bloch I, the Seventh Circuit found the hallway rule to 
be neutral and generally applicable with respect to religion.209 
Viewing the rule as facially neutral and seeing no requirement 
for religious accommodation under the Fair Housing Act, the 
court took their analysis no further.210 By stopping their 
analysis at this early stage, the opinion failed to determine 
whether the hallway rule had a disparate impact on 
individuals of particular religious groups. The Bloch II court 
recognized that while the hallway rule may have been neutral 
when first adopted, the crux of the Blochs’ claim was that the 
reinterpretation of the rule in 2004 was not neutral.211 Yet the 
court never engaged in disparate impact analysis to address 
this, and remanded the case only for determination of 
intentional discrimination. But, violations of both the Fair 
Housing Act and the First Amendment can be made by proving 
that a disparate impact results from application of a facially 
  
 203 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
 204 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722.  
 205 Id. at 723.  
 206 Id. at 714.  
 207 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 208 See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 714-15; Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
 209 Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), 533 F.3d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 2008), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 210 Id. at 564-65.  
 211 Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch II), 587 F.3d 771, 783 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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neutral rule.212 Advanced analysis of the implications of the 
hallway rule sheds light on the fact that perhaps disparate 
impact analysis would have led to a different outcome.  
Under Fair Housing disparate impact analysis, even if 
we begin with the assumption that discriminatory intent is not 
outwardly evident, when we look to the factors for determining 
whether a violation has occurred, the answer appears to be 
overwhelming.213 First, there is a strong showing of 
discriminatory effect here as the hallway rule results in the 
constructive eviction of Jewish residents since they can no 
longer display their mezuzot.214 This effect is significant as it 
inhibits observant Jews from living in the condominiums they 
have purchased, and effectively creates a situation where the 
Shoreline Towers Condominiums are able to exclude Jewish 
residents. Second, discriminatory intent is not absent here.215 
Rather, the record is replete with evidence of discriminatory 
intent. The fact that the hallway rule was in place for three 
years before the association decided to change its applicability 
to include the display of mezuzot was clearly a targeted 
action.216 The Association began to remove and confiscate 
mezuzot without giving notice to the residents of the new 
interpretation of the hallway rule, and continued this practice, 
eventually culminating in a threat to the Blochs that affixation 
of a mezuzah would result in a monetary penalty.217 In addition, 
the fact that the display of mezuzot does nothing to inhibit the 
stated goal of the hallway rule, to protect the hallways’ 
appearance,218 is further evidence of the rule’s discriminatory 
intent.  
  
 212 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
534 (1993); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934-35 
(2d Cir. 1998), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 (1988). 
 213 See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 
1290 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 214 See id.; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
 215 See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 558 F.2d at 1290.  
 216 Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), 533 F.3d 562, 567 (Wood, J., dissenting), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc); Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 773 
(“Though Frischholz knew as early as 2001 that removing mezuzot would be a problem 
for Lynne Bloch, he made no effort to stop the staff from repeatedly tearing them down. 
Instead, he accused Lynne of being a racist, called her a liar, encouraged other tenants 
to vote against her reelection to the Association’s Board of Managers, and told her that 
if she didn’t like the way the rules were enforced, she should ‘get out.’”). 
 217 Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 567.  
 218 Response Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 9, Bloch v. Frischholz, 533 F.3d 
562 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3376). 
2010] FAIR HOUSING AFTER BLOCH 1439 
To add insult to injury, the condominium association 
removed the Blochs’ mezuzah after they requested special 
permission to display one only for a limited time to conform to 
the Jewish mourning rituals after the death of Marvin Bloch. 
The condominium association’s action demonstrates that 
another motivation, other than the hallway’s appearance, was 
at issue.219 Finally, the fact that the condominium board 
rejected a proposal to create a religious accommodation 
amendment to the hallway rule, when such an amendment 
would have no impact on the achievement of the rule’s purpose, 
seems to indicate that they may have had an ulterior motive. 
This rejection is additional evidence of the association’s 
discriminatory intent in interpreting the hallway rule to 
prohibit even the display of religiously-mandated objects.220  
Looking to the final two factors,221 it seems clear that not 
only did Shoreline lack an interest in taking this action, but 
also that all the Blochs were seeking to achieve with their 
lawsuit was to prevent interference with their individual 
property rights. Shoreline cannot legitimately say that the 
amendment proposed by the Blochs was objectionable on any 
sound basis. If the hallway rule’s purpose really is simply to 
protect the appearance of the hallways, then the display of 
small religious objects such as a mezuzah does not contradict or 
undermine this purpose in any way. This is a question of fact 
that remained to be brought before a jury.222 Thus, the 
defendants had no interest in taking this action.223 Finally, the 
Blochs did not request that the Court require Shoreline to take 
an affirmative action to provide housing for religious 
minorities. Rather, they merely sought to protect their own 
individual property rights, which they were prevented from 
  
 219 Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 567 (Wood, J., dissenting) (“Perhaps the worst episode, 
and one that gives rise to a strong inference of anti-Semitic animus occurred while the 
Blochs were mourning the death of Dr. Marvin Bloch, Lynne’s husband and Helen and 
Nathan’s father.”). 
 220 Id. at 568. 
 221 See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 
1290 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 222 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants Urging Reversal and Remand on Fair Housing Act Claims at 37, Bloch v. 
Frischholz, 533 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3376) (explaining that “were the jury 
to find that the Association’s actions were motivated in part by plaintiffs’ race or 
religion, it does not matter that the Association acted under the aegis of neutral 
Hallway Rule 1”). 
 223 See id. 
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exercising.224 Given the analysis of these factors, a violation of 
the Fair Housing Act has likely occurred, even without a 
reading of the statute that requires religious accommodation, 
because of the disparate impact of the hallway rule on 
observant Jewish residents and the fact that HUD has 
interpreted the Act to apply to post-acquisition 
discrimination.225 
Under the First Amendment, while the seemingly 
facially neutral and generally applicable hallway rule at issue 
in Bloch might initially be seen as a situation warranting only 
rational-basis review,226 this superficial analysis oversimplifies 
the complexity of the issues raised in the case. As the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City 
of Hialeah227 makes clear, strict scrutiny must be applied where 
the purpose of a law is to impede the practice of religion.228 In 
his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia expounds on this, noting 
that strict scrutiny is required where “laws which, though 
neutral in their terms, through their design, construction, or 
enforcement, target the practices of a particular religion for 
discriminatory treatment.”229 That is precisely the type of rule 
at issue here.230 The hallway rule, while neutral on its face, has 
been enforced only to the detriment of observant Jews, who are 
no longer free to display their mezuzot. Where the application 
of a facially neutral law reveals religious animus and results in 
disparate impact on only one religious group, the law can no 
longer be deemed “neutral.”231 Thus, the Condominium 
Association’s interpretation of the hallway rule to include a 
prohibition on the display of mezuzot, combined with their 
  
 224 See id.  
 225 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 226 See Employment Div., v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990). 
 227 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 228 Church of Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 533 (“Although a law targeting 
religious beliefs as such is never permissible, if the object of a law is to infringe upon or 
restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, and it is 
invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to 
advance that interest.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 229 Id. at 557 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 230 In fact, the Bloch II court recognized this as they cited to this case in their 
discussion of intentional discrimination noting, “The First Amendment ‘forbids subtle 
departures from neutrality’ and ‘covert suppression of particular religious beliefs.’” 
Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch II), 587 F.3d 771, 785 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing 
Church of Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 534). This statement, however, has heavy 
implications for assessing just how “neutral and generally applicable” the hallway rule 
actually is. 
 231 Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533 (majority opinion). 
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continual removal of the Blochs’ mezuzah despite specific 
requests to display it, demonstrate a potential religious 
motivation behind the rule.232 The situation, therefore, warrants 
strict scrutiny. When subject to that exacting standard, the 
hallway rule would certainly fail to overcome the requirement 
that the rule be justified by a compelling interest and narrowly 
tailored to meet that interest.233 If the Association’s goal was 
truly to rid the hallways of clutter, there are certainly less 
restrictive ways of obtaining this result, including allowing for 
a religious exception to the rule. It is likely then, that had the 
Seventh Circuit looked beyond the face of the rule, it would 
have realized that the situation at bar was analogous to that at 
issue in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. and therefore 
warranted a greater level of scrutiny and deeper analysis than 
it was given.  
In acting on its concern for the leniency with which the 
constitutionality of laws that infringe on religion are assessed, 
Congress passed legislation that limited the ability of the 
government to infringe on individuals’ exercise of religion, 
which was scrutinized by the Supreme Court and upheld.234 In 
Cutter, the Supreme Court observed that RLUIPA does not 
“elevate accommodation of religious observances over an 
institution’s need to maintain order and safety . . . 
accommodation must be measured so that it does not override 
other significant interests.”235 It seems logical, therefore, that 
there could be and should be a statutory requirement for 
religious accommodation in housing as long as it does not 
undermine a significant interest, for example, with a 
compelling interest exception and without giving enhanced 
privileges to one religion over another.236 Such a requirement 
would not violate the Establishment Clause and would achieve 
the objective of the Free Exercise Clause, allowing individuals 
to freely practice their religions.237 
  
 232 See supra notes 214-219 and accompanying text. 
 233 Church of Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 533. 
 234 See discussion of RLUIPA supra notes 198-206 and accompanying text.  
 235 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005). 
 236 See id. at 723-33.  
 237 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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IV. THE ROAD FORWARD: THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE 
LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
The Seventh Circuit’s cursory ruling in Bloch I 
essentially opened the door for private housing associations to 
arbitrarily create neutral and generally applicable238 rules that 
only affect one group of people and, in doing so, effectively keep 
protected classes out of their units. This result is in direct 
conflict to the stated objectives of the Fair Housing Act, and if 
taken to the extreme, could cause the nation to revert to 
segregated housing systems like those that were predominant 
at the time the statute was enacted.239 While the circuit 
partially remedied these potentially devastating effects by 
remanding the case for a determination on the issue of 
intentional discrimination, the initial ruling is one that courts 
in other circuits could easily follow and the courts’ denial of the 
Blochs’ § 3604(a) claims still allows great leeway for housing 
owners to subvert the spirit of the Fair Housing Act. The 
decision, however, is not without remedy. In light of the harsh 
consequences that this decision could have on the future of fair 
housing in the United States, the state and federal legislatures 
are in the best position to prevent religious discrimination in 
housing of the type that plagued the Blochs. In fact, some 
states have already begun to take action, which should 
encourage other states to become involved in remedying the 
potentially damaging consequences. In the face of judicial 
decisions that have negative policy implications, the other 
branches of government are the only bodies in a position to 
curtail the effects of such decisions on the general welfare of 
society.  
In the past, when Congress has disapproved of judicial 
interpretations of the Fair Housing Act and the First 
Amendment, it has taken steps to overcome these decisions and 
promote the ideals they originally sought to achieve.240 The 
  
 238 Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch I), 533 F.3d 562, 564 (7th Cir. 2008), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing Employment Div. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990)). 
 239 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.  
 240 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2006) (providing that “a member of the armed 
forces may wear an item of religious apparel while wearing the uniform of the 
member’s armed force” with only two exceptions—(1) item would interfere with 
performance of military duty; or (2) if the item is determined not to be “neat and 
conservative”), which Congress passed in response to Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 
503 (1986) superseded by statute, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 
1988 and 1989, Pub. L. 100-180, 101 Stat. 1086 (1987) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 774) 
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Seventh Circuit’s holdings in Bloch I and Bloch II have 
extreme policy implications for the future of private housing 
associations and their ability to discriminate against particular 
classes, namely religious groups. Since statutory law can 
effectively prevent these harsh effects from becoming reality, 
the legislature is in the best position to prevent the 
discrimination in the housing market that could result from 
this decision.241 Although the decision may be merely persuasive 
in jurisdictions outside of the Seventh Circuit, there is no 
reason why other jurisdictions will not follow the Seventh 
Circuit’s lead in creating an incredibly low burden for 
determining whether a Fair Housing Act or First Amendment 
violation has occurred.242  
The legislatures in some jurisdictions have already 
taken action to prevent the effects of this decision from creating 
a situation contrary to that envisioned by the drafters of the 
Fair Housing Act. While the Bloch case was pending in the 
district court, Chicago enacted an ordinance that prohibits 
residential building owners from restricting the placement of 
religious objects in the doorways of homes unless the individual 
creating the restriction can prove that such a restriction is 
necessary to avoid property damage or undue hardship to other 
unit owners.243 Similarly, two years later, Illinois adopted a law 
requiring condominium associations to reasonably 
accommodate “religious practices, including the attachment of 
religiously mandated objects to the front-door area of a 
condominium unit.”244 Additionally, despite the fact that the 
Bloch I decision was not binding precedent in New York, 
legislators in the state have proposed a bill that would 
effectively overturn the Bloch I decision and affirmatively 
  
(holding that a prohibition on the wearing of headgear, including religiously-mandated 
headgear, while on Air Force duty was constitutional; in response, Congress passed a 
statute allowing religiously-mandated headgear to be worn while on duty which was 
also deemed constitutional).  
 241 See 42 U.S.C. § 3601; see also Otero v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 
1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 242 In fact, just months after the Seventh Circuit rendered its decision, Bloch 
was cited by a district court in the Southern District of New York for the proposition 
that, “creating a rule that equates failure to accommodate with discrimination would 
be particularly inappropriate in the context of the FHA, which explicitly provides for 
accommodation of handicap, but not race, sex or religion.” Ungar v. N.Y. City Hous. 
Auth., No. 06-Civ.-1968, 2009 WL 125236, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2009).  
 243 See Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 564; CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE 05-8-030(H) 
(2005). 
 244 See Bloch I, 533 F.3d at 564; 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/18.4(h) (2007). 
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guarantee condominium owners the right to have religious 
displays, including mezuzot, outside of their homes.245  
Representative Jerrold Nadler, the voice behind the 
proposed New York legislation, also brought the Freedom of 
Religious Expression in the Home Act of 2008 (FREHA) before 
the House of Representatives in September 2008,246 continuing 
his crusade to voice disapproval with the Seventh Circuit’s 
precedent-setting decision in Bloch I. The bill went before the 
House, with twenty-four co-sponsors, but was never enacted 
into law.247 If enacted, FREHA would have effectively addressed 
the Blochs’ problem by “amend[ing] the Fair Housing Act to 
prevent discrimination relating to the display of religious 
symbols.”248 This proposed amendment to the Fair Housing Act 
would allow individuals to display religious symbols in their 
homes, unless prohibition on such displays was “reasonable 
and necessary to prevent significant damage to property, 
physical harm to persons, a public nuisance or similar undue 
hardship.”249 On September 17, 2008, FREHA was referred to 
the House Judiciary Committee, and currently remains a 
potential source of relief for the near future.250  
CONCLUSION 
Bloch v. Frischholz brought to light the immense impact 
that hasty decisions can have by setting important precedents 
  
 245 Josh Gerstein, A Nadler Bill Would Legalize Mezuzahs, N.Y. SUN, Sept. 19, 
2008, available at http://www.nysun.com/national/a-nadler-bill-would-legalize-mezuzot/ 
86223/ (last visited July 12, 2009).  
 246 Freedom of Religious Expression in the Home Act of 2009. H.R. 6932, 
110th Cong. (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi? 
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Representatives Jerrold Nadler (D-NY), Lamar Smith (R-TX), Robert Wexler (D-FL), 
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 247 Freedom of Religious Expression in the Home Act of 2009. H.R. 6932, 
110th Cong. (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi? 
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 249 OU Applauds Introduction of Legislation, supra note 246. 
 250 Freedom of Religious Expression in the Home Act of 2009. H.R. 6932, 
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with harsh realities. Although the Seventh Circuit attempted 
to ameliorate the potentially devastating consequences that the 
Bloch I decision could have had, the possibility of adverse 
implications has not been dispelled. If the Blochs’ intentional 
discrimination claim does not prevail on remand, then the 
initial threat of condoning discriminatory housing practices, 
which the Bloch I decision presented, still exists. Additionally, 
regardless of the outcome on remand, the potential for this 
result remains because the Bloch decision will be precedent in 
just one circuit. Such a reality comes in spite of the existence of 
the Fair Housing Act, which has promoted non-discriminatory 
housing practices throughout the United States since its 
enactment forty years ago. In the past, congressional action has 
been, and continues to be, the best means of overcoming 
judicial decisions that are contrary to the ideals of the nation. 
Congress should explicitly create a narrowly tailored religious 
accommodation clause in the Fair Housing Act. The legislative 
intent of the Fair Housing Act seems to speak to the fact that 
religious accommodation is necessary to achieve the ideals of 
the Act. Further reference to the treatment of religious 
accommodation under the First Amendment in parallel 
contexts gives an indication of how such a requirement could be 
developed in a way that would be both constitutionally 
permissible and potentially further the goals of the Fair 
Housing Act. 
A narrowly tailored religious accommodation 
requirement in the Fair Housing Act would not violate the 
First Amendment. Rather, such a requirement would walk the 
fine line between noninterference with religion, as required by 
the Free Exercise Clause, and a separation of church and state, 
as required by the Establishment Clause.251 The Supreme Court 
itself has recognized that there is space for legislative action 
that is not “compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor 
prohibited by the Establishment Clause.”252 
This Note has argued that legislative action creating an 
accommodation requirement under the Fair Housing Act falls 
into this “space” and would be the most effective means of 
overcoming and preventing the potential consequences of the 
  
 251 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005).  
 252 Id. 
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Seventh Circuit’s decisions in Bloch v. Frischholz.253 The 
complementary goals of the Fair Housing Act and the First 
Amendment have the ability to “ensure that all persons live 
comfortably together in our pluralistic society and that all 
persons have access to safe, decent, sanitary housing where 
they can exercise their right to worship or not worship as they 
choose.”254 With this exceptional ability right at our fingertips, 
failing to achieve this ideal would wreak havoc on the progress 
made since the enactment of the Fair Housing Act. The law 
affords all citizens the ability to create change and live in a 
nation where they are free from religious persecution and 
discrimination. Upholding a decision that effectively subverts 
this notion is unjust and divergent from the ideals upon which 
this nation was founded. 
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